Participatory location fingerprinting through stationary crowd in a public or commercial indoor environment by Hossain, A. K. M. Mahtab & Loukas, George
Participatory Location Fingerprinting through Stationary
Crowd in a Public or Commercial Indoor Environment
A K M Mahtab Hossain
ISEC Research Group, University of Greenwich
London, United Kingdom
a.k.m.hossain@gre.ac.uk
George Loukas
ISEC Research Group, University of Greenwich
London, United Kingdom
g.loukas@gre.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
The training phase of indoor location fingerprinting has been tradi-
tionally performed by dedicated surveyors in a manner that is time
and labour intensive. Crowdsourcing process is more efficient, but
is impractical in public or commercial buildings because it requires
occasional location fix provided explicitly by the participant, the
availability of an indoor map for correlating the traces, and the
existence of landmarks throughout the area. Here, we address these
issues for the first time in this context by leveraging the existence of
stationary crowd that have timetabled roles, such as desk-bound
employees, lecturers and students. We propose a scalable and ef-
fortless positioning system in the context of a public/commercial
building by using Wi-Fi sensor readings from its stationary occu-
pants’ smartphones combined with their timetabling information.
Most significantly, the entropy concept of information theory is
utilised to differentiate between good and spurious measurements
in a manner that does not rely on the existence of known trusted
users. Our analysis and experimental results show that, regard-
less of such participants’ unpredictable behaviour, including not
following their timetabling information, hiding their location or
purposefully generating wrong data, our entropy-based filtering
approach ensures the creation of a radio-map incrementally from
their measurements. Its effectiveness is validated experimentally
with two well-known machine learning algorithms.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A significant portion of a human’s daily life is spent indoors. The
emergence of smart ubiquitous applications generally requires ac-
cess to a human’s location information in such indoor environ-
ments too. Yet, despite having garnered tremendous interest in the
research community, there is still no de-facto standard for indoor
location determination (i.e., indoor localisation). Traditionally, two
families of indoor localisation research have been pursued: one
that requires specialised hardware (e.g., customised devices) and
infrastructure setup within the localisation area [16, 20], and the
other that utilises existing communication infrastructure such as
Wi-Fi [1, 22] or Bluetooth [8]. The first family can enable centimetre-
level accuracy with the help of specialised indoor infrastructure,
but is extremely costly. Therefore, it is deemed impractical for a
commercial or public indoor environment. Even though the sec-
ond family provides coarser localisation accuracy (2 to 3 meter or
sometimes even room-level granularity), it can be more practical
and cost-effective for a public or commercial building facilitating
location based services (LBSs), such as locating the nearest store
or distributing electronic coupons in proximity to various business
intelligence applications. Within this second family, location fin-
gerprinting is a particularly popular approach, which involves one
or more surveyors tasked with conducting a training phase by po-
sitioning themselves at several points of interest and collecting the
signal strength samples. This process is time-consuming and labour
intensive, hence suffers in terms of scalability in commercial and
public building scenarios. Also, the surveyors need to be aware of
the geometry of the building for explicitly indicating their position
within an indoor map. Access to a map of a public or commercial
building comprising of multiple owners or tenants can also be quite
difficult for such purpose.
A newer trend of localisation techniques encourage implicit par-
ticipation of users in such premises to achieve the same goal, with
the main motivation of being the elimination of the surveyor’s
laborious training phase of fingerprinting. This approach gener-
ally involves crowdsourcing inertial sensor measurements (e.g., ac-
celerometer, gyroscope, compass, etc.) from people’s smartphones,
followed by the application of Simultaneous Localisation and Map-
ping (SLAM) with dead-reckoning, sensor fusion and filtering tech-
niques (e.g., Kalman) to compute the location [6, 17, 19]. These
crowd-sourced localisation approaches have been shown to be im-
practical for a public or commercial building [11] because of the
requirement of an occasional location fix provided explicitly by the
participant, the availability of an indoor map for correlating the 
traces, and the existence of landmarks throughout the area.
In this paper, we leverage the existence of a “stationary” crowd 
in an indoor environment for localisation purpose. In a public or 
commercial building, a number of people’s positions can be con-
sidered stationary during a certain time of the day, and this is also 
supported by research findings such as [3]. For example, a salesper-
son in a shopping mall or a security guard of an office is expected 
to be at a certain location during working hours. This is generally 
true for many desk-bound employees in such public or commercial 
buildings. In a school or university, a student or teacher operates 
according to timetabling information. For example, a student might 
be scheduled to attend a tutorial session in room X at 2 pm on 
Tuesdays, and a teacher may deliver a lecture in room Y at 10 am on 
Wednesdays. In our approach, the crowd-sourced sensor readings 
(specifically Wi-Fi) from only these stationary personnel’s smart-
phones are correlated with their expected position at certain times 
to formulate the location fingerprint. As a result, the need of a sur-
veyor together with the aforementioned issues of the fingerprinting 
approaches are avoided.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
(1) We propose a scalable and effortless indoor positioning sys-
tem in the context of a public/commercial building by util-
ising its stationary occupants’ smartphones’ Wi-Fi sensor
readings combined with their timetabling information. We
argue that this implicit participatory location fingerprint-
ing radio-map creation will relieve the traditional laborious
training phase.
(2) While the stationary crowd need not be aware of the underly-
ing location-based data collection, there must be a provision
for incorporating only the good quality sensor readings and
filtering out spurious ones, for example if a user is not at
his/her expected position (for legitimate or even malicious
reasons). For this purpose, we utilise the entropy concept of
information theory to differentiate between good and bad
quality sensor measurements. To the best of our knowledge,
no work has used entropy in the creation of a fingerprinting
radio-map database before.
(3) Our approach has been experimentally validated using data
collected from a floor of our university campus. A few lec-
turer volunteers participated in building the fingerprinting
radio-map for the floor comprising of seven office rooms.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we
discuss our idea of using entropy to differentiate between good and
bad quality crowdsourced sensor measurements, and a resulting
filtering algorithm for incorporating them into fingerprinting radio-
map. We provide a brief description of related work in Section 3. In
Section 4, we present our evaluation with experimental findings.
Finally, we discuss in Section 5 the conclusions drawn, and our
future work.
2 INFORMATION CONTENT IN
LOCALISATION
2.1 Location Fingerprinting Principle
Suppose there is a set of l distinct rooms/locations where the i th
room is denoted by level Li . According to the location fingerprinting
principle, each location is expected to be uniquely identified in the
signal domain. In other words, each fingerprint has one-to-one map-
ping to the set of locations, L = {L1,L2, . . . ,Ll } where |L| = l . Let
this set of fingerprints, F be denoted by, F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fl } where
|F | = l . Traditionally, if n access points (APs) or anchors are ob-
served at a particular location, Li , the corresponding fingerprint of
Li in the signal domain can be represented as, Fi = {F 1i , F 2i , . . . , Fni }.
The quantity, F ji can take the form of a simple average received sig-
nal strength (RSS) indication [1] to a histogram representation of dif-
ferent signal levels [22] or even a much complex probabilistic mea-
sure [12] of the observed RSSs from AP j, where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}.
Majority of such location fingerprinting techniques utilise the
already available wireless communication infrastructure indoors
(e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth) in order to build the radio-map, i.e., a collec-
tion of < Li , Fi > tuple obtained from the perceived RSS samples
where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l }. The conventional way of constructing such
radio-map was to laboriously survey the whole localisation area,
and collect the RSSs, i.e., Fi ’s at the points of interests Li ’s. The loca-
tion determination phase consists of first acquiring the fingerprint,
by a client device at an “unknown” location. Subsequently, this
perceived measurement will be compared against the fingerprints,
Fi ’s of the stored radio-map < Li , Fi >, and the best match will be
returned as the corresponding location.
2.2 Probabilistic Localisation
Probabilistic localisation algorithms will return the most likely Li
among the set of training locations/rooms, L == {L1,L2, . . . ,Ll }
where |L| = l , given the perceived fingerprint, S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm }.
Themaximum a posteriori (MAP) algorithm is based upon the Naive
Bayes classifier that computes argmaxi P (Li |S ), where P (Li |S ) is
expressed by the formula,
P (Li |S ) = P (S |Li )P (Li )∑l
i=1 P (S |Li )P (Li )
. (1)
As commonly seen in the literature [12, 22], the perceived sig-
nal strength from a particular AP or anchor can be considered
independent from other APs at a location. Subsequently, P (S |Li ) is
computed from the training radio-map database as,
P (S |Li ) =
m∏
j=1
P (S j |Li ). (2)
Without loss of generality, if all the locations/rooms are equally
likely, then, P (Li ) = 1l . By choosing the normalising constant as∑l
i=1 P (S |Li ) = 1 in (1), the MAP can equivalently be written as,
argmax
i
P (Li |S ) = argmax
i
P (S |Li )
= argmax
i
m∏
j=1
P (S j |Li ). (3)
−∞
2.3 Entropy and Information Content
Entropy expresses the measure of uncertainty. For a continuous 
probability distribution,∫ ∞ p (x ) of a random variable x , its entropy is defined as, H  =  −  p(x ) ln p(x )dx . Thus, minimising the max-
imum conditional probability distribution (3)’s entropy will cor-
respond to: given the true measurement, the computed location
estimation will be the least random. In other words, if we could re-
duce the uncertainty in RHS of (3), fingerprinting based algorithms
are likely to produce more accurate estimations. Our filtering al-
gorithm for crowdsourced measurements that we discuss in the
next section is motivated by this. In order to add a crowdsourced
measurement, we first compute the entropy of the resulting signal
strength’s probability distribution at the claimed location after its
incorporation, and compare it with its existing entropy. We only
accept the measurement if the resulting entropy is smaller. In other
words, we discard any measurement, the incorporation of which
increases the uncertainty in (2)’s modelling.
In order to derive the cumulative entropy of all the observed
APs’ signal strength distributions at a particular location, we first
present the differential entropy expression considering only one. In
localisation literature, a single AP j’s signal strength distribution,
P (S j |Li ) at a particular location, Li is generally assumed to be nor-
mally distributed supported by experimental results [11, 12]. We
also follow this claim. If P (S j |Li ) ∼ N (µ j ,σj ), then a normal distri-
bution’s differential entropy expression can be directly used to rep-
resent the entropy of AP j’s signal strength distribution as follows,
H = − ∫ ∞−∞ (2πσ 2j )− 12 e
−(x−µj )2
2σ 2j ln [(2πσ 2j )
− 12 e
−(x−µj )2
2σ 2j ]dx . By sim-
plifying the RHS using the identities,
∫ ∞
−∞ (2πσ
2
j )
− 12 e
−(x−µj )2
2σ 2j dx = 1,
and
∫ ∞
−∞ (2πσ
2
j )
− 12 (x − µ j )2e
−(x−µj )2
2σ 2j dx = σ 2j , we obtain,
H =
1
2 ln (2πσ
2
j ) +
1
2 =
1
2 ln (2πeσ
2
j ). (4)
Using (4), the differential entropy of n-dimensional Gaussian
probability densities which is the entropy of RHS of (2) is computed
as,
Hn =
n
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n )
1
n . (5)
This is shown in [15] by McEliece. A simplified derivation of (5)
can be provided based on the independence assumptions of the
observed signal strengths from the APs at a location [12, 22], and
the property that the differential entropy ofn independent Gaussian
variables is the sum of their individual entropy values, i.e.,
Hn =
1
2 ln (2πeσ
2
1 ) +
1
2 ln (2πeσ
2
2 ) + . . . +
1
2 ln (2πeσ
2
n )
=
1
2 ln
{
(2πe )nσ 21σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n
}
=
n
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n )
1
n .
2.4 Filtering Approach Based on Entropy
We conceptualise a filtering technique for crowdsourced measure-
ments based on information content. Let us assume that incor-
porating a measurement,S received at a certain time, t results
in the differential entropy, H ′n of the probability distribution of
the observed signal strength at the claimed location. If the orig-
inal differential entropy without this contribution is denoted by,
Hn =
n
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n )
1
n , then the overall filtering algorithm
works in two steps as follows: i) check whether a participant’s mea-
surement’s input time, t is within the time constraint ts ≤ t ≤ tf ,
where ts and tf may be the starting and finishing time of his/her
working hours, respectively, and ii) for all measurements satisfying
the time constraint mentioned in (i), compute H ′n , and
< Li , S >=
accept, if H
′
n < Hn
reject, otherwise
(6)
The algorithm operates according to two constraints: i) a time
constraint, and ii) an entropy constraint based on our previous
section’s discussion. The time constraint follows the idea that if
an occupant’s submitted measurement comes at a different time
other than his/her expected location’s timing, it is not accepted. The
entropy constraint ensures that only the good quality crowdsourced
measurements will be incorporated but the inappropriate ones will
be discarded. In other words, only the measurements that reduces
the uncertainty of the signal strength distribution at the claimed
location inside the fingerprinting radio-map will be accepted.
Fig. 1 depicts our overall entropy based fingerprinting localisa-
tion approach. The crowdsourced measurements from participants’
smartphones are collected and stored inside a central server. Each
submitted measurement takes the form of an expected location at a
time that may come from the participant’s timetabling information,
and the observed Wi-Fi signal strengths from the perceived APs
during that time. The “Entropy-based filtering” entity consists of
the algorithm that we discuss in this section. Its detailed algorith-
mic description that we implement is omitted for brevity. If the
measurement is passed by this filtering entity, it is then fed into
building the machine learning model’s fingerprinting radio-map of
the claimed location. During run-time or location determination
phase, the collected measurement is used as input for the machine
learning model’s reasoning to obtain the location. Note that, for
our evaluation of whether the filtering algorithm is efficient or not,
we stored all the measurements irrespective of whether it is filtered
or not. Hence, the “Entropy-based filtering” entity is followed by
the central server storage in Fig. 1. For practical deployments, it
should generally appear before the operation of storing the mea-
surements once the effectiveness of the filtering algorithm is proven.
Consequently, only the good quality measurements will be stored.
2.5 Accept and Reject Scenarios
In this section, we will discuss a series of accept and reject scenarios
for our filtering algorithm’s entropy constraint (6). We provide
proofs as to why measurements from certain scenarios should be
accepted or rejected with intuitive explanation. They will later be
supported by our experimental results in Section 4.
Lemma 2.1. If Fi = {Fki }, k = {1, 2, . . . ,n} denotes the existing
signal strength distribution of n APs at the claimed location, Li , the
measurement S = {S j }, ∀j ∈{1,2, ...,m } (j , k ) will always be rejected.
Figure 1: Our entropy-based fingerprinting localisation approach
Proof. In this scenario, none of the claimed observed APs of the
measurement, S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm } appears in the existing finger-
print of the location, Li . The differential entropy after incorporating
this measurement is represented as,
H
′
n = Hn+m
=
n +m
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
nσ
2
n+1 . . . σ
2
n+m )
1
n+m
=
n +m
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n )
1
n+m +
1
2 ln (σ
2
n+1 . . . σ
2
n+m )
=
n +m
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n )
1
n − m2n ln (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n )
+
1
2 ln (σ
2
n+1 . . . σ
2
n+m )
= Hn +
m
2n ln (2πe )
n (σ 21σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n ) −
m
2n ln (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n )
+
1
2 ln (σ
2
n+1 . . . σ
2
n+m )
= Hn +
m
2 ln (2πe ) +
1
2 ln (σ
2
n+1 . . . σ
2
n+m )
> Hn ,
Consequently, the input measurement, S will be rejected by (6). □
Since the measurement may be produced in an automated and
arbitrary manner, it is unlikely to include any AP that was observed
at the same location inside the existing fingerprinting radio-map.
Therefore, this type of measurement should not be accepted.
Lemma 2.2. A measurement S = {S1, S2, . . . Sm } will be rejected
(accepted) if after incorporation, at least one of the AP’s signal strength’s
deviation (improvement) is more from its previously stored distribu-
tion, while the rest remains the same.
Proof. Suppose, the j th AP’s signal strength’s deviation is more
than its stored distribution, i.e., σ ′j
2
> σ 2j , while for the rest, they
remain the same, i.e., ∀i ∈{1,2, ...n }\{j } (σ ′i
2
= σ 2i ). Subsequently, it
can be proved that S will be rejected by (6) as follows,
H
′
n =
n
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
′
j
2
. . . σ 2n )
1
n
>
n
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
j . . . σ
2
n )
1
n , since, lnx is a
monotonically increasing function for x > 0.
= Hn .
The accept scenario’s proof is exactly the same as above, where
σ
′
j
2
< σ 2j which results in H
′
n < Hn . □
It was discussed in Section 2.3 that a measurement is accepted
only if it reduces a particular location’s overall signal strength
distribution’s uncertainty. Lemma 2.2 imposes a strict rejection
constraint upon the measurement which takes into consideration
that an intruder may snoop the signal strength, thereby gaining
knowledge about the signal map of that particular indoor location.
He/she may then submit tampered measurement to corrupt the
fingerprinting radio-map. Incorporation of it will likely result in
deviation from the previously stored fingerprints. This is prevented
since the filtering approach rejects any measurement that causes
deterioration in regard to even one AP’s stored distribution while
the rest remains the same.
In the above, we discussed a specific scenario where the intruder
deliberately attempts to corrupt any particular AP’s or a group
of APs’ fingerprints inside the training radio-map assuming the
rest will remain the same. Next, we derive a generalised expression
denoting the level of manipulation required by the intruder so that
his/her malicious measurement is accepted. For this to happen, it
can be shown using (5) that the impact of deterioration of a few
APs’ fingerprints should be offset by the improvement of a few
others through manipulation of the measurement perceived at the
location. Suppose among n APs’ signal distribution model stored as
a location fingerprint, I of themwere improved, J were deteriorated,
and the rest remained the same. In other words, ∀i ∈I (σ ′i
2
< σ 2i ),
∀j ∈J (σ ′j
2
> σ 2j ), and ∀k ∈{1,2, ...n }\{I∪J } (σ
′
k
2
= σ 2k ).
Lemma 2.3. The magnitude of allowed deviation of J APs’ stored
signal strengths’ distributions is bounded by the I APs’ achieved
improvement by incorporating the same fingerprint, i.e.,
σ
′
I+1
2
σ 2I+1
σ
′
I+2
2
σ 2I+2
. . .
σ
′
I+J
2
σ 2I+J
<
σ 21
σ ′1
2
σ 22
σ ′2
2 . . .
σ 2I
σ ′I
2 .
Proof. According to our algorithm, an input measurement is
accepted iff, H ′n < Hn .
⇒ n2 ln 2πe (σ
′
1
2
. . . σ
′
I
2
σ
′
I+1
2
. . . σI+J
′2
σ
′
I+J+1
2
. . . σ
′
n
2
)
1
n
<
n
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1 . . . σ
2
I σ
2
I+1 . . . σ
2
I+Jσ
2
I+J+1 . . . σ
2
n )
1
n ,
⇒ (σ ′1
2
. . . σ
′
I
2
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2
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) < (σ 21 . . . σ
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I σ
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σ 2I+1
σ
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2
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I+J
2
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<
σ 21
σ
′
1
2
σ 22
σ
′
2
2 . . .
σ 2I
σ
′
I
2 .
□
This implies that on one hand, it will require extensive knowl-
edge of the existing radio-map database on the intruder’s part,
and on the other hand, it will limit the magnitude of deviation
from the original fingerprint that can be caused. Additionally, even
if the intruder was successful, the negative impact can be offset
by subsequent good quality measurements by others at the same
location.
Lemma 2.4. A measurement S = {S1, S2, . . . Sn , Sn+1} with a
newer (n + 1)th AP’s reading at a location will be accepted under
the following condition, σ 2n+1 <
1
2π e
σ 21
σ ′1
2
σ 22
σ ′2
2 . . .
σ 2n
σ ′n
2 .
Proof. Incorporating the measurement S , the resulting entropy
is, Hn+1 = n+12 ln 2πe (σ
′
1
2
σ
′
2
2
. . . σ
′
n
2
σn+12)
1
n+1 . S is accepted iff,
n + 1
2 ln 2πe (σ
′
1
2
. . . σ
′
n
2
σn+1
2)
1
n+1
<
n
2 ln 2πe (σ
2
1σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
n )
1
n ,
⇒ σ 2n+1 <
1
2πe
σ 21
σ
′
1
2
σ 22
σ
′
2
2 . . .
σ 2n
σ
′
n
2 . (7)
□
Eq. (7) gives an idea of the initial sample’s variance to be set
which is influenced by the improvement achieved from other n APs’
distributions. For example, if σ 2n+1 = 1, the required improvement
should be greater than 2πe for the measurement to be accepted.
We need to carefully consider this scenario as it influences how
missing APs from the stored distribution can be part of the actual
fingerprint. Following (7), it is straightforward to show that form
newAPs to be integrated through a measurement, the improvement
required is greater than (2πe )m . This also ensures the crowdsourc-
ing mechanism of creating fingerprinting radio-map evolves over
time while still being adaptable to environmental changes.
3 RELATEDWORK
The field of crowdsourced indoor positioning has received consider-
able attention over the last few years. Most of the related research
focuses on increasing accuracy by optimising the reasoning ap-
proach, for example through ensemble learning [21], collaborative
sensing between nearby devices [13] or activity detection [23], as
well as on increasing efficiency [5] and reducing computational
complexity [24].
Here, our focus instead is on filtering out unreliable data at the
labelling stage. The handling of unreliable data labelling is a key
challenge not only in crowdsourced indoor positioning but more
generally in all participatory sensing applications. For example,
Barnwal et al. [2] have followed a Bayesian approach to enhancing
the reliability of a vehicular participatory sensing system. The ra-
tionale is that confidence can be estimated based on the conditional
probability of occurrence of a particular traffic event at a partic-
ular location given that supporting reports have been generated.
Also, Gisdakis, Giannetsos and Papadimitratos [9] have proposed a
comprehensive framework that is agnostic of the cause of a faulty
measurement. Each report is transformed into a probability mass,
so as to compute the hypothesis with the maximum belief; the
belief corresponding to this hypothesis; and the local conflict of
the probability mass, as per Dempster-Shafer Theory. Its output is
a partitioning into inliers and outliers, which is dependent on the
existence of an ‘honest majority’. The system then compares the
similarity between the inlying reports of two neighbouring units
with a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. It uses a merging
and training phase, followed by an ensemble of machine learning
classifiers to characterise incoming reports as inliers or outliers, and
a concept drift detection module to detect changes in the statistical
properties of the sensed phenomenon. The framework has been
evaluated on environmental monitoring.
Specifically for indoor positioning, Li et al. [14] have proposed
defences for different adversary models and attacks. Their logic
is that an initial set of measurements from trusted users can be
used to infer the trustworthiness of the fingerprints submitted by
unknown users. The authors have used two metrics to evaluate
trustworthiness and a corresponding iterative algorithm to build a
reliable fingerprint radio-map in the presence of unreliable reports.
The first metric is the temporal correlation within an RSS trace, as
fingerprints collected by different users tend to exhibit a similar
RSS trend (e.g., when the user walks towards an AP, the RSS in-
creases, and when the user walks away, it decreases). The second
is the spatial likelihood, which captures the spatial RSS correlation
between the fingerprints from the same position in different traces.
However, the defences proposed assume that there are always some
users that can be trusted, such as the employees in a shopping mall,
and this may not always be the case. For example, an employee
may have reasons to want to hide their location at a specific point
in time.
Cheng et al. [4] have proposed a technique for addressing the
challenge of missing values in participatory sensing. The key idea
is to employ the spatio temporal compressive technique originally
proposed in [18] to reconstruct the sensory data given an incom-
plete and partially inaccurate dataset if the sensory data being
reconstructed exhibit low-rank structure and spatio-temporal prop-
erties. One of the two case studies evaluated is crowdsourced Wi-Fi
fingerprinting. 10 users equipped with smartphones were asked to
walk through a university campus for two hours. Their technique
involves inferring the smartphones’ proximity based on other multi-
dimensional sensor readings, and to derive a corresponding spatial
constraint. This was feasible because the users are non-stationary
and specifically tasked with the work of fingerprinting, so that a
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Figure 2: Performance of filtering approach while incorporating different types of participants’ measurements
Figure 3: The four types of participants considered
sensor node could obtain substitute sensor readings from the next
time slot.
Zhou et al. [25] have proposed a minimax conditional entropy
principle to infer ground truth from noisy crowdsourced labels.
Based on this, they derived a unique probabilistic labelling model
jointly parameterised by worker ability and item difficulty. This is
the only known example of work in the literature that has proposed
to benefit from entropy for identifying unreliable crowdsourced
labels. However, it has not been evaluated on dataset related to
location fingerprinting.
The above solutions proposed in the literature for handling un-
reliable data in participatory sensing either have not been designed
and evaluated for indoor positioning applications or assume that
volunteers are tasked with walking through areas with the purpose
to collect series of spatio-temporal data that can be cross-checked
for their veracity, or that there exist users whose measurements
can always be considered as trusted. In our work, we do not need to
record users’ movement across different locations other than their
destination as expected by their pre-defined timetable, and we also
do not assume the trustworthiness of a select set of users. Next, we
present the experimental evaluation of our approach.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Experimental Setup and Participant Groups
We collected measurements from seven rooms of a building of our
university campus where four rooms are on one side and the rest are
on the other side divided by a corridor. Each room has the dimension
of 7.85m× 3.8m. We involved lecturer volunteers who are the users
of those rooms. Their timetabling information were pre-loaded in a
smartphone application that was given to them. The smartphone’s
application perceives the Wi-Fi signal strength, and correlates it
with the location retrieved from the timetabling information by the
software running inside the particular volunteer’s smartphone, and
sends it to a central server. All measurements satisfying the time
constraint as discussed in Section 2.4 are stored.
The crowdsourced measurements do not require the participants
to explicitly indicate their locations where they are taken, and they
can be oblivious of the data collection procedure. In order to provide
supporting results for the proofs of Section 2.5, we first discuss four
different types of participants based on the scenarios (Fig. 3), and
then describe how we emulate their measurements:
i) Regular: participants who remain at their expected locations at
the time their devices submit the measurements,
ii) Irregular: participants who are not at their timetabled locations
during submission,
iii) Random: adversarial participants who wish to hide their loca-
tion by generating automated or arbitrary measurements that do
not correlate with the indoor environment’s geometry and commu-
nication infrastructure, and
iv)Rogue: adversarial participants who intentionally try to corrupt
the radio-map database through tampered measurements.
All the collected measurements in our experimental setup are
considered to be input by regular participants. The measurements
from the other participants are emulated by manipulating a regular
participant’s measurement as follows. Suppose, < Li , Fi , S > repre-
sent the <location, stored fingerprint, measurement> at the claimed
location Li where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . l }. An irregular participant’s mea-
surement < Lj , S > is emulated by selecting a location Lj from a uni-
form distribution of the available locations, {Lj }, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . l } \ {i},
that is different from Li . In order to create a random participant’s
measurement, we first select the number of arbitrary APs, x from
U (1,m) whereU (.) denotes a uniform distribution over the range.
We chosem = n where n is the number of APs observed at Li , and
∀j ∈{1,2, ...x } (j < {1, 2, . . .n}). Then, each of the x signal strengths
is generated from U (RSSmin,RSSmax). In our experiments, we set
RSSmin = −90 dBm, and RSSmin = −30 dBm. To emulate a rogue
participant’s measurement, we first pick a number x form U (1,n),
and then choose a set of x indices again from U (1,n). Then, each
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . x } AP’s signal strength is selected from a Gaussian
distribution N (S j ,σ 2) where we change σ 2 to control the deviation
of noise.
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Figure 4: 25%-75% split between already existing and incorporating different types of participants’ measurements
4.2 Results and Discussion
125 measurements were recorded from our volunteers across seven
rooms. We randomly divided them into 5 sets of 25 measurements
each. 5-fold cross validation was used where 4 sets (100 measure-
ments in total) were used as fingerprinting radio-map (training)
in each fold, and the remaining (25 measurements) were used as
testing samples.
With the first set of experiments, we aim to show the effec-
tiveness of our filtering approach discussed in Section 2. For this
purpose, we assume that there are already some existing measure-
ments inside the fingerprinting radio-map. We consider three cases
where the training samples were separated between already ex-
isting and the participants’ contributions. 25%–75%, 50%–50% and
75%–25% depict the separation between already existing and par-
ticipants’ contributions, respectively. Five different training sample
points, 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100 are considered for each separation. The
different participants’ measurements were modelled following the
previous section’s discussion. Fig. 2 is constructed as the average of
10 experimental runs with 95% confidence interval. Each run consti-
tutes an instance of 5-fold cross validation. Our filtering approach’s
effectiveness can be seen from the results of Fig. 2. 100% of the Ran-
dom participants’ measurements were filtered. This directly follows
Lemma 2.1. Another observation is that the filtering approach’s
performance improves as the sample size increases concerning both
Irregular and Rogue measurements. This can be perceived for all
three separations. This is intuitive since a larger sample size is ex-
pected to model the fingerprinting radio-map with less uncertainty
which in turn will improve the filtering performance. Furthermore,
the incorporation of regular measurements remain steady across
various sample sizes and different separations. This is an important
characteristics, because the filtering approach ensures good quality
measurements are accepted, and also, it is not overly restrictive.
This follows the property of Lemma 2.2 and 2.3. One may argue that
why 100% regular measurements were not accepted by the filtering
approach. It is a well-known phenomenon in localisation litera-
ture that even at the same location, the perceived signal strength
may vary due to environmental factors, device heterogeneity, and
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Figure 5: 50%-50% split between already existing and incorporating different types of participants’ measurements
also the time of the day [11]. This justifies a proportion of regular
measurements being filtered. We argue that as long as a steady
stream of good quality of regular measurements are ensured to be
incorporated, the fingerprinting radio-map will evolve over time.
This is the case as can be seen in Fig. 2. With 75% existing training
samples, the least number of regular measurements are discarded
which is again intuitive since the filtering approach’s modelling is
based upon a larger sample size compared to the 25% and 50% ones.
For the second set of experiments, we retained the same sepa-
ration across similar training sample points as the previous one.
Two well-known machine learning algorithms such as Nearest
Neighbour (NN) and maximum a posteriori (MAP) are then applied.
For comparison, we considered both ’with filter’ and ’without fil-
ter’ training dataset, where one results from applying the filtering
approach, and the other consists of all the measurements with com-
plete trust. The testing dataset comprises of 25% measurements in
each fold of 5-fold cross validation as described in the beginning
of this section. The results of the two algorithms’ are presented in
Fig. 4, 5, and 6. In general, for all combinations, both algorithms’
localisation accuracy is better for ’with filter’ variant than its ’with-
out filter’ counterpart. This is evident more when the sample size
increases. This directly follows from our previous experiment’s
results too since the filtering approach performed better with larger
sample size, and also for 75%–25% separation which consequently
gave rise to a more accurate radio-map for the machine learning
algorithms. This leads to another observation that irrespective of
the different types of participants’ measurements, the localisation
accuracy reached similar levels for both algorithms (see 100 training
sample points’ results for the four different types of participants’
measurements of Fig. 6). Also, we expect the results based on Reg-
ular participants’ measurements for ’with filter’ variant should
generally follow the trend of its ’without filter’ counterpart which
is generally observed in Fig. 4(a), 5(a) and 6(a). These findings vali-
dates our claim that our entropy based fingerprinting approach can
result in an effortless and scalable IPS for a public or commercial
building.
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Figure 6: 75%-25% split between already existing and incorporating different types of participants’ measurements
We conclude this section with a few more details. While it can
be argued that NN is another form of MAP, we have utilised deter-
ministic average RSS as NN’s fingerprint, and applied Euclidean
distance between fingerprints for location estimation decision. MAP
is implemented following Section 2.2’s model. This might be the
reason for inferior performance of MAP compared to NN in our
experiments, where MAP generally requires a significant number
of samples for its fingerprint modelling. The number of samples
per room (≈ 18) in our experiments was relatively small. Both algo-
rithms were implemented with efficient data structure, and have
run-time complexity of O (nl ) where l is the number of locations,
and n is the dimension of the fingerprint at each location. NN pro-
vided better localisation accuracy with almost 85% correct detection
of rooms. We observed more than 300 different Wi-FI APs in total
within just one premise during our data collection process. Our
university wireless network providers are only considered which is
a natural localisation choice for any particular commerical or public
building that reduces this number to 125. However, only on-demand
availability for energy conservation purpose, heterogeneity of mo-
bile devices with varying capability to scan the nearby APs, and
spatio-temporal factor result in variability in the number of APs
observed at a certain location. This can give rise to missing RSS
phenomenon of fingerprinting techniques [7, 10] that we perceive
in our radio-map as well. We believe this also has adverse impact on
both the algorithms’ offered localisation accuracy since we adopt an
elementary imputation practice that substitutes the missing value
with the minimum RSS (e.g., -96 dBm). There are multiple research
work as in [7, 10] that try to resolve this missing RSS phenomenon,
which we consider to be out of scope for our work. Because, our
crowdsourced fingerprinting approach’s benefit is independent of
the choice of the machine learning algorithm, and any other im-
provements that they may be incorporated. This claim follows from
our observation that in all our experiments, the ’with filter’ variant
is generally better than its ’without filter’ counterpart. We contend
that by adopting an appropriate missing value resolution techinque,
and considering more advanced machine learning algorithms is
likely to offer better localisation accurary compared to the two
simplistic ones that we considered here. For the presented results 
concerning the Rogue participants, we fixed the Gaussian noise 
deviation, σ of its modelling (see Section 4.1) to be 20. We observed 
that for lower values than 20, it performs almost like the Regular 
participants’ contributions that were even better. This is quite intu-
itive looking at Fig. 3 since lower σ will shift the participants’ level 
of adversarial tendency from high to low. For higher values of σ , 
more measurements are required to achieve the similar accuracy 
as the presented ones since higher proportion of them are filtered 
by our algorithm. Those results are omitted for brevity.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a scalable and effortless fingerprinting-
based IPS in the context of a public/commercial building by lever-
aging the existence of a “stationary” crowd, and correlating their 
smartphones’ Wi-Fi sensor readings with their timetabling infor-
mation. Both our analysis and experimental results have shown 
that, regardless of such participants’ unpredictable behaviour, i.e., 
not following their timetabling information, our entropy based fil-
tering approach ensures the creation of fingerprinting radio-map 
incrementally from their measurements. We considered four types 
of participants’ behaviours to support our claim. The localisation 
performance of two machine learning algorithms was evaluated 
based on the created fingerprinting radio-map which has shown 
our approach’s effectiveness.
By having provided a practical means for introducing partic-
ipatory location fingerprinting through the stationary crowd of 
a commercial or public building, we anticipate the generation of 
several future work directions. For example, we have assumed a 
few measurements to exist inside the fingerprinting radio-map in 
all scenarios (i.e., the 25%-75%, 50%-50% and 75%-25% separations) 
of our filtering approach’s experimental evaluation. The creation 
of radio-map from scratch with no existing fingerprint will require 
modifications to our current filtering approach so that the few ini-
tial measurements are integrated only after careful consideration, 
i.e., imposing additional constraints. More experiments with dif-
ferent public or commercial building setup and size other than a 
university campus can be conducted to establish applicability in 
very large indoor areas and involving large crowd. Also, the radio-
map created following our approach could easily be applied to train 
different families of machine learning models, and subsequently 
compare their localisation performance with finer granularity. Fi-
nally, a rigorous theoretical framework can be pursued to show 
that the entropy based filtering approach can incrementally create 
the training radio-map. In this paper, experimental validation was 
provided together with the relevant lemmas with proofs.
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